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CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM AND RELIGIOUS 
LANGUAGE 
by Gilbert FuImer 
Some contemporary philosophers contend that linguistic discourse is di- 
vided into numerous logically discrete conceptual schemes. It is said that the 
statements we make fall into various categories, such as science, religion, 
ethics, etc.; very strong claims have been made about the logical isolation of 
these schemes from one another. They are said to be logically discrete, in the 
sense that it is impossible for an argument in any one category to criticize, 
evaluate, or refute a statement in any other; such an argument, the contention 
is, would of course be based on the presuppositions of its own scheme. Each 
conceptual scheme is thus marked off by boundaries which cannot be crossed 
by argument. For example, it is said that religious statements have a logic of 
their own, and that it makes no sense to suppose that they can be evaluated 
by the criteria of another category, such as science. Conceptual schemes are 
therefore said to be immune to outside criticism. 
I will call this view "conceptual relativism," following Kai Nielsen.' And 
I will use the term "conceptual scheme" in the same sense as do the philoso- 
phers I am discussing. Others have used this term in other ways; some, for 
example, speak of schemes that encompass the whole of a person's or a soci- 
ety's thought and speech, and that can be transcended or escaped only with 
the greatest difficulty, or not at all. But I am concerned here solely with the 
use I will discuss. 
Conceptual relativism is often supposed to follow from the later work of 
Wittgenstein, with its emphasis on the role of "language-games" in human life. 
I believe Wittgenstein's work does not require such a reading, and that his 
position by no means commits him to conceptual relativism; but I will not 
argue these points here, Instead, I will try to show that there is a fundamental 
mistake in the claim that any argument which cuts across the boundaries of 
these schemes must for that reason be invalid. 
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If this claim were correct, there would be far-reaching consequences, as 
indeed its exponents recognize. It would never be possible to discover funda- 
mental incoherence at the center of a conceptual scheme; if the schemes are 
discrete, no fundamental criticism of any one can be coherent. This thesis has 
been used to support relativism of various sorts: for example the claim that 
there could be radically different methods of counting and calculating,' and 
that primitive magic may be logically defensible.= But I will confine my discus- 
sion to religious language. 
Conceptual relativism is clearly an important notion, but is it correct? I will 
argue that it is not; but first I will cite several examples, in order to make clear 
exactly what I am criticizing. If I am correct my argument wiIl defend a large 
class of philosophical arguments from the charge of a priori invalidity. I 
believe that it is impossible to reject arguments wholesale, so to speak, just 
because they cut across conceptual boundaries. It is only useful to speak of two 
distinct conceptual schemes as a description of what we have discovered 
through argument; this notion cannot limit the applicability of arguments in 
advance. 
First I will discuss an argument offered by Alasdair MacIntyre in "The 
Logical Status of Religious Belief."4 MacIntyre tries to show that certain 
historical claims to which the Christian is committed could not be refuted by 
any conceivable historical evidence. This is because the Christian has chosen 
the presuppositions on which he bases his beliefs; and in his system nothing 
can be accepted as counting against these basic beliefs. For example, Christians 
believe that Jesus of Nazareth was crucified in Jerusalem; this is said to be a 
matter of ordinary historical fact, as well as a belief of great religious impor- 
tance. If it were somehow to be proved that Jesus never existed, the beliefs of 
most Christians would be radically altered. 
MacIntyre argues that these historical claims could not be refuted; and no 
matter what discoveries were made by historians, the Christian could never be 
forced to abandon his belief. Any evidence which appeared to count against 
it could simply be discounted by the Christian. For  he will accept as relevant 
only the Bible and Christian teaching. MacIntyre says: 
What I want to suggest 15 that everythtng of Importance to rellg~ous falth 1s outslde the reach 
of h~storlcal ~nvestlgatton That, for Instance, in asklng whether the Resurrect~on happened 
we are not In fact asking a questlon whlch future hlstorlcal tnvestlgatlon rn~ght settle IS 
apparent ~f we conslder how any evldence that rn~ght be d~scovered would be assessed 
the essence of the New Testament clalm, as we have seen, IS that certain past events can 
be part of a rel~glous bel~ef, that IS that they can be belleved in on author~ty 
Now, MacIntyre insists that the Christian is being perfectly rational in so 
rejecting evidence; it is not just that he is psychologically unable to face 
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facts. MacIntyre says, "Every field is defined by reference to 
certain ultimate criteria. That they are ultimate precludes going beyond 
them."' Thus the Christian is free to choose what he will accept as counting 
for or against statements about events in the past; he chooses the Bible as his 
ultimate authority, and he may rightly dismiss anything that conflicts with it. 
Justification of religious beliefs is possible only by appeal to the defining 
authority of the religion, and criticism likewise. No outside considerations are 
relevant, even in evaluating factual assertions like that about Jesus' crucifixion. 
Acceptance of the New Testament as the authority for statements about 
historical events is IogicalIy fundamental for the Christian, and hence unas- 
sailable: no argument from any other system can count against it. 
W. D. Hudson offers a similar view of the isolation of religious discourse 
from other forms of language. He says: 
l ~ k e  any other conceptual scheme, a r e l ~ g ~ o n  1s based logtcally upon presupposltrons, and 
IS bounded logically by front~ers, the former must be accepted, and the latter respected, if 
the game Ir to be played or the form of l ~ f e  taken up In the case of thelsm, we must dec~de 
whether or not to deal In questions and answers whlch have to d o  w ~ t h  God T h ~ s  decis~on 
IS Iog~cally l ~ k e  dec~dlng whether or not to do sclence, thlnk morally, or take up some branch 
of mathematics. It IS the d e c ~ s ~ o n  to glve or not glve, a certaln frame to expertence ' 
Here again we see the claim that whatever religionists choose to say is, so 
to speak, logically their own affair. For anyone to challenge them would be to 
deny their presuppositions, which would of course be merely to counter one 
set of presuppositions with another. Naturally no argument can show one set 
of consistent premises more valid than any other. So Hudson concludes that 
we cannot evaluate religious discourse as a whole, either to justify or discredit 
it. "It ~ o u l d  seem that it is an illusion to think that philosophy can do more 
than reveal its presupposition and draw its logical frontiers. That presupposi- 
tion is God and those frontiers mark off talk about God from other kinds of 
talk."' Hudson cheerfully accepts the conclusion this view entails: evaluation 
of conceptual schemes is logically impossible; they can only be described. 
1v 
A similar theme is developed by D. Z. Phillips." Many contemporary 
philosophers, says Phillips, have mistaken the nature of religious propositions. 
They have asked the general question whether cIaims to have experienced God 
can ever provide evidence of God's existence; it would be more appropriate, 
he thinks, to inquire about the validity of particular claims of religious experi- 
ence. For the criteria of validity in particular cases involve such things as the 
doctrine of the Church, and the role of the experience in the believer's life; but 
these are criteria withirz religious language. These criteria can be applied as a 
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part of that discourse, but it makes no sense to ask for a general justification 
of them. Phillips says, "My difficulty is in finding any meaning in this philo- 
sophical request for a general justifi~ation."'~ 
What must be reallzed, he thinks, is that religious statements have meaning 
within a form of Iife, and not outside it; it is possible to describe the role they 
play in this form of life, but not to criticize the form of life as a whole. There 
is no neutral ground on which to stand to evaluate religious beliefs, or any 
others; their stgnificance comes from the linguistic context where they are 
found. 
A central tenet of the relativism I am discussing is that criticism cannot cut 
across the boundaries of conceptual schemes, because the criteria of truth, 
rationality, etc., are grounded in their respective schemes. Thus each scheme 
has ~ t s  own internal criteria, which may not be criticized by any other. G. E. 
Hughes adopts this position in his review of Religious Belief; by C. B. Mar- 
tin." Martin claims that relig~ous statements are in fundamental disarray; 
there are inconsistencies and incoherences built into the very central concepts 
which cannot be expunged, but only concealed o r  ignored. Children are taught 
the language of religious belief with evasion and obscurity present from the 
beginning, charges Martin, and these cannot be eliminated later on. 
Hughes does not agree; he believes that these statements are in perfectly 
good order a t  rock bottom. Mistakes can occur, of course, in religious lan- 
guage, but they are no more necessary or central than in other areas of 
discourse. Against Martin's charge that religious language is conceptualIy 
confused, Hughes asks, 
whdt are our crrterla here for conceptual confusion? I should gues? that rt IS possrble to show 
o ~ y  category of statements or expressrons to be conceptually confused rf one 1s allowed to 
1ns15t hat they must conform to the logrc of some other category or categories of statements 
or expressrons rf they are to be said to make sense l 2  
Hughes proposes an "alternative programme" for meta-theology: 
~t consnts In allowing ihe actual use of rellglou~ terms and statements to determine thelr 
logrc, rather than trying to force an allen loglc upon them. If we adopt thls basrq, we can 
then regard arguments whlch show how rellgrous statements generate contradrctlons when 
they areconstrued on the model of other types ofstatements, not as demonstratrng that they 
are conceptually confused, but as showrng by contrast some of the pecullarrt~e\ of therr own 
logrc 'J 
Each conceptual scheme, then, has its own "logic," which governs the 
propriety of statements made within it. Thus statements in the language of 
religious belief are logical o r  illogical, true or false, according to the criteria 
CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE 37 
of logic and truth which operate within that language. Even if some such 
statements were shown to violate the criteria of rationality or truth of some 
other scheme, this would be of no consequence. The  most that one can do from 
outside such a self-sufficient conceptual scheme is to map its structure so as  
to show just what the rules may be that govern it. Hughes says, 
the actual wage of religious terms with111 religious language is taken as normative for the 
logical type and the klnd of meaning they have . . religious language is a long-established 
fair accor~7p//, and something wh~ch does a job which, as far as  I have been able to discover, 
no other segment of language can do l 4  
This "alternative programme" is a perfect example of conceptual relativism. 
Religious language, according to Hughes, cannot be criticized from without, 
for that would involve "forcing an alien logic" upon it. The boundaries be- 
tween conceptual schemes, then, are logically impenetrable: no arguments can 
cross them. 
These "schemes" have several interesting characteristics: 
a) There are many distinct conceptual schemes, e.g., science, religion, and 
morality. 
b) The presuppositions, rules of inference, criteria of rationality, etc., of 
each scheme are the only ones relevant to it; no others can count. 
c) The criteria, rules, etc., for a scheme may be chosen at will; i.e., a scheme 
may be constructed in any fashion, as Iong as it is internally consistent. 
d) One is free to choose in which schemes to participate and which not; e.g., 
whether to do  science or religion; and one can participate successively in any 
number, so long as he respects the rules of each while engaging in it. 
When these characteristics are listed in this way, a clear analogy emerges 
between the relativists' conceptual schemes and the formal deductive systems 
of mathematical logic. Like an uninterpreted calculus, each scheme is logically 
isolated from all others. No scheme can be criticized or evaluated by argu- 
P cares ments based in different schemes. There can be as many schemes as on, 
to construct. Moreover, the relativists say we are free to select any consistent 
set of premises we choose in constructing a scheme, and to apply any rules of 
inference we like. The Christian is free, Hudson says, to choose God as his 
presupposition, and to  draw whatever conclusions follow within his system. 
And MacIntyre claims the Christian can dismiss evidence which others would 
think counted against his beIief, for he can select his rules of inference at will. 
Insofar as the schemes can be shown to exhibit the characteristics attributed 
to them, the analogy with deductive systems may be enlightening: if it should 
turn out on examination that the schemes do  function in this fashion, this 
would be of great interest. But nothing has been said to establish that they do  
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so function; therefore no inferences should be drawn from the supposed anal- 
ogy. In particular, we should not assume that any argument which "crosses 
conceptual boundaries" is automatically invalid, or that whatever is said 
within any scheme is necessarily in conceptual order. 
V I I  
We must try to see whether this notion of discrete conceptual schemes is 
correct. The relativists tell us that criticism and argument cannot cross concep- 
tual boundaries. Therefore the precise location of these boundaries is, for them, 
a matter of great importance: knowing to  what scheme a locution belongs helps 
to determine its logical implications. For they believe that it can have none in 
schemes other than its own. 
The method the relativists use to identify the scheme is the source, or 
context, in which the locution appears. For example, it is widely agreed 
nowadays that it is a mistake to use Genesis to dispute geologists' conclusions 
about the age of the earth. If one asks such questions, the answers are to be 
found through the methods of science. And of course it would also be a mistake 
to argue that Genesis is worthless because it is not a reliable source of infor- 
mation about geology. The relativists say that either argument would be 
invalid because it cuts across the conceptual boundary between science and 
rel~gion. 
But the relativists' argument is neatly circular. They say that there are 
logically discrete conceptual schemes; then they tell us that criticism and 
argument cannot cross the conceptual boundaries between them. Well, if the 
schemes and the boundaries are as described, ofcourse criticism and argument 
cannot cross them. For the schemes have been defined as logically discrete. But 
now it does no good to explain that criticism and argument cannot cross the 
boundaries because the schemes are discrete, for that is simply to repeat the 
original assumption. T o  take the source of a remark as conclusive evidence 
about the scheme to which it belongs is to assume the relativistic conclusion, 
not to support it. Argument is needed to show that in fact conceptual schemes 
are logically isolated, and that therefore the criticisms are irrelevant; this 
argument is never provided. 
If we are to conclude that the geologists' assault on Genesis, and the funda- 
mentalists' attack on geology, are conceptual blunders, we will have to do more 
than to note rhat the first appears in a scientific journal and the second in a 
tent meeting. That is, we need some other way of showing that there is an 
important logical difference between what the two are doing, so that the 
conflict may in some way be resolved, 
V I I I  
The relativists make the location of conceptual boundaries primary: the 
logical implications of the assertions we make are to be discovered by observing 
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whether or not they stay within the bounds of their own scheme. But we have 
just seen that the relativist cannot support his position by taking the source 
of the locution as identifying the scheme. How, then, are we to learn where 
the boundaries lie? 
The only way, I suggest, is to examine the use of the various expressions. 
In the case of the dispute between geology and Genesis, we learned that there 
was no real conflict by noticing that the assertions of geology have a very 
different function from those of the Bible, If one is concerned to know the age 
of the earth, one must look to the methods of natural science, for the logical 
grammar of propositions about the past determines what sort of evidence is 
relevant. Getzesis cannot yield such information. And Genesis, too, has its own 
characteristic uses, which are beyond geological criticism, since they do not 
involve scientific facts. 
We might say, then, that we have discovered a "conceptual boundary" 
between the language of religion and that of science. But this only means that 
Ge~zesis cannot refute geology, and vice versa. We did not begin with the 
knowledge that there were two discrete conceptual schemes, and then conclude 
that therefore Genesis has no  implications which contradict geology; the 
boundary between these two schemes just is the fact that different types of 
evidence and argument are relevant to each. Attention to the respective uses 
reveals the differences between their logical geography; different purposes are 
involved, and therefore different types of locution are required. 
What we learn is not that it is somehow "truew-within fundamentalist 
Christianity-that the earth is less than six thousand years old, and also "true" 
-within science-that it is several billion years old. Rather, we learn that 
what appeared to be statements about factual matters made by the fundamen- 
talist (and what are probably taken by him to  be so) cannot intelligibly be 
interpreted as such, for they do  not conform to the logic of stating facts about 
the past. If we wish to defend the distinctive religious uses of Genesis, we 
should not do so by claiming that two contradictory assertions are both true. 
Instead, we shouId recognize that this and many other religious remarks 
appear to have the form of factual assertions, but are now used according to 
a wholly different logical pattern. 
The relativists believe that conceptual boundaries precede and limit philo- 
sophical analysis-that is, that we can know in advance that it is impossible 
to criticize any scheme according to the criteria of another (Hughes), or to 
criticize schemes in their entirety (Hudson and Phillips). But if my argument 
is correct, it is only through the analysis of uses that we discover the bounda- 
ries; and therefore it is only through such analysis that we can learn to which 
"scheme" a given locution belongs, So we cannot deduce anything about the 
logical implications of a locution from its origin in a particular context: the 
preacher may engage in putative fact-stating discourse in the pulpit, and 
scientists may utter remarks which conform to the logic of religious language. 
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Tfze logical bolitzdaries are in fact discovered through atzalysis of rhe use, so those 
boundaric.~ carrtzot liinif such art analysis. 
IX 
An illustration is in order. As we have seen, MacIntyre has argued that each 
conceptual scheme may have its own presuppositions, rules of inference, and 
so forth. He therefore believes it is logically proper for the Christian to  adopt 
the Bible as his ultimate authority even for historical propositions. Thus, he 
says, the Christian may dismiss any conceivable evidence which conflicts with 
his beliefs. If a manuscript were to be discovered in which all the disciples 
described the methods they had used to cozen and deceive the gullible public, 
and if the best evidence were to indicate that it was authentic, MacIntyre 
would still say that it could be dismissed from consideration. For he holds that 
the Christian takes the Bible as an absolute authority concerning cuch histori- 
cal propositions. Let us examine this proposal to accept factual assertions on 
authority, to see what it could mean. 
Suppose we accept the New Ycrk Times of Sunday, May 18, 1975, as the 
logically ultimate authority concerning the events it reports. The Tirnes is not 
to be taken as evidence about what happened the previous week, not even as 
the very best evidence. It is the sole criterion, and nothing whatever can be 
counted against it. Thus we will accept the Times as our logically ultimate 
presupposition, just as MacIntyre says the Christian adopts the Bible, Does 
this make sense? I believe not. 
If the Titnes says a certain John Smith was killed falling into an excavation 
on a certain corner, then we must not doubt that he was. If a hundred 
respectable people swear that they saw him in perfect health after the time of 
the reported accident, this can make no difference. If there are buildings on 
all four corners of that intersection, and the newest is twenty years old, this 
is irrelevant. If Smith himself appears and testifies that he was in no accident, 
it proves nothing. 
Clearly all this is nonsense; it makes a mockery of the concept of the past. 
Nothing could be more preposterous than saying that a man's own testimony 
cannot establish that he is alive! And MacIntyre's suggestion that Christians 
may reject substantial evidence that contradicts their beliefs is equally sense- 
less. It just is not open to us to decide by fiat what is to count as evidence for 
statements of fact about the past. We can examine the language of past events 
to learn what should be taken as evidence; but we cannot change that language 
at will. Documents, including the Bible, can provide reasons o r  evidence for 
beliefs about past events; but they cannot be logically ultimate authorities, for 
they cannot be used as such. We can see now that talk of logically ultimate 
authorities is out of place here, as is talk of choosing what is to count as 
evidence. Decisions about what is evidence are not on a footing with the choice 
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of postulates for a deductive system; what counts as evidence is shown in the 
language. As Wittgenstein said, "What is a telling ground for something is not 
anything I decide."15 
X 
The relativists suppose that it is possible simply to choose their presupposi- 
tions at will, and that no one can gainsay their choice. If they wish to regard 
the Bible as an ultimate criterion, that is their right, they claim; and they 
cannot be criticized unless they are inconsistent within their system. They 
think it makes sense to adopt linguistic rules of their own choosing, and then 
to usa those rules for whateverpztrposes they wish, such as stating facts. But the 
example shows the sort of nonsense to which this view leads. 
The above argument sheds light on the language of past events. It shows 
something about how the truth about past events is ascertained, and what 
kinds of things are good reasons for beliefs about the past. It demonstrates that 
books, including the Bible, can be reasons or evidence for such beliefs, but that 
it makes no sense to say that any one is a logically ultimate criterion. T o  hold, 
as did MacIntyre, that nothing can count against the historical statements in 
the Bible is to make a conceptuaI blunder as a result of overlooking the nature 
of the language of past events. And this blunder is revealed by examination 
of that language, and of the consequences which follow if we accept MacIn- 
tyre's argument. This examination shows that it is not open to us to decide 
arbitrarily what to call good reasons for believing something about the past. 
We do  not begin with the a priori knowledge that religious language and 
statements about the past are different universes of discourse, and conclude 
that therefore a religious commitment cannot intelligibly be taken as a logically 
ultimate criterion of truth about the past. Instead, we notice the differences 
between the two by discovering how MacIntyre's supposition leads to absur- 
dity. If we now wish to describe our discovery by saying that these are two 
distinct conceptual schemes, well and good. But we should not reverse the 
logical order of these ideas, and suppose that the arguments are invalid because 
they cross boundaries between conceptual schemes. 
Premises and rules of inference can be stipulated at will in an uninterpreted 
calculus precisely because the propositions of such a calculus have no implica- 
tions beyond itself. But the propositions of Western religions claim factual 
truth; most Christians believe, as MacIntyre says, that the New Testament 
account of Jesus' life and death is historically true in just the same way that 
an account of Caesar's life and death might be. There are rules which must 
be followed when dealing with factual truth; for example, it is essential to the 
concept of factual truth that relevant evidence must not be simply dismissed. 
Such rules are required if the stating of facts is to play the role it does in life 
and language; it is unintelligible to suppose that facts could be stated while 
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these rules are ignored. If MacIntyre had concentrated on the various uses of 
language, he might have seen that it is one thing to hold that there are 
characteristically religious uses of language, and quite another to declare that 
they entitle the Christian to assert factual beliefs that are contradicted by the 
relevant evidence. 
So the analogy between conceptual schemes and deductive systems breaks 
down, and with it the relativists' attempted defense of religious claims. It is 
nonsensical to say that the Christian may ignore evidence which contradicts 
his bellefs; if he wishes to make statements of historical fact then he is bound 
by the rules that govern fact-stating discourse. Otherwise he is simply not 
stating facts. One who insisted in the face of the evidence that John Smith died 
in that excavation might have his own peculiar purposes, but we could not 
accept his remarks as a statement of fact. If they have a point, it must be of 
a very different sort. 
We must not suppose, then, that whatever is said by religionists constitutes 
an isolated conceptual scheme, immune from all criticism; nor is this true of 
the pronouncements of scientists. If statements about Jesus' life are to function 
as assertions of historical fact, they must take account of historical evidence. 
The Christian cannot, therefore, place biblical authority above factual evidence 
in supporting his assertions. And of course the scientist should recognize that 
there are important forms of language other than the conveyance of factual 
information. 
The idea of impenetrable logical boundaries between disparate conceptual 
schemes puts the cart before the horse. Whatever boundaries may lie between 
modes of discourse can be discovered only by careful examination of individual 
uses of language to reveal their logical behavior. In speaking of "boundaries" 
we merely attach a label after the work is done. This is not wrong, but ~t is 
philosophically trivial. 
When the conceptual relativists state their thesis about the logical disparity 
of conceptual schemes, it appears that something very profound and important 
is being said. For it seems that they have discovered a new way of assessing 
the validity of philosophical arguments, by reference to the conceptual 
schemes in which they are grounded. But if I am correct the significance of 
these boundaries is small. For the boundaries exist only insofar as they reflect 
the relevance and validity of the reasons given for a conclusion. So saying that 
criticism and argument cannot cross conceptual boundaries just means that 
criticism and argument are invalid where they are invalid! Nothing very inter- 
esting IS being said after all. 
Conceptual relativism, then, is a mistake. It assumes, without argument, 
that there are logically isolated schemes. Making this assumption, it supposes 
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that one can adopt any rules of inference, etc., one wishes within a scheme. 
But what counts as evidence for factual beliefs is not anything that can be 
changed at will; it is given in the Ianguage. So the short-cut method of dismiss- 
ing arguments which "cut across boundaries" is of no use, since we must 
evaluate the arguments to find the boundaries. Speaking of "conceptual 
schemes" does not help us avoid the hard philosophical spadework of analyz- 
ing the various uses of language. And it certainly provides no support for the 
relativistic thesis that what is factually false in one form of discourse may 
somehow be true in another. 
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